On 3 November 2025, Venezuela’s ZODI 34 Cojedes—a regional command of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB)—released a video displaying full-scale decoy versions of critical air defense and ground systems. The mockups include ZU-23 twin anti-aircraft guns, 120 mm mortars, VN-4 armored cars, and even replicas of S-300VM and Buk-M2E launchers.

The purpose is to saturate U.S. surveillance efforts and inflate Venezuela’s order of battle, forcing adversaries to devote more reconnaissance, validation, and strike resources. Analysts note that this “phantom army” approach increases operational costs for U.S. planners and lengthens decision timelines in any potential conflict.

ZODI 34 Cojedes operates within REDI Los Llanos, coordinating military, police, and civil defense activities across Cojedes State. Major General Elvis Rafael Durán Lobo currently commands the unit.

Venezuela’s integrated air defense network includes S-300VM long-range batteries, Buk-M2E medium-range systems, Pechora-2M, ZU-23 guns, and MANPADS. By replicating these key assets with decoys, the Venezuelan Armed Forces seek to make every potential strike more expensive and less reliable.

This deception strategy comes amid tightened U.S. sanctions and reports of new Russian deliveries (Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E systems) to Caracas. Combined with the use of decoys, these narratives amplify deterrence by creating ambiguity around the true strength and disposition of Venezuelan defenses.

The decoys themselves are made from lightweight, inexpensive materials—plywood, composites, and inflatable structures—with rudimentary heat sources and wiring to simulate radar and thermal signatures. Historical precedents from Serbia (1999) and the Russia-Ukraine conflict show how simple decoys can mislead advanced ISR systems and waste expensive precision munitions.

CAVIM (Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares), Venezuela’s state defense manufacturer, reportedly supports serial production of such mockups and thermal simulators. Distributed workshops within the FANB structure can scale output rapidly with local materials, enhancing deterrence at minimal cost.

Ultimately, this cost-imposition strategy aims to protect Venezuela’s real air defenses, deter preemptive strikes, and complicate U.S. operational planning by presenting a dense, uncertain threat picture—an asymmetric yet effective use of deception and resourcefulness.