The Kremlin has formally directed Russia’s foreign and defense ministries, intelligence services, and civilian agencies to prepare coordinated proposals for possible nuclear weapons testing. According to the TASS news agency, President Vladimir Putin reiterated that Russia would only conduct such tests in response to a nuclear-explosive test by another power.

During a Security Council session, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov emphasized that Novaya Zemlya’s infrastructure remains fully operational, enabling rapid activation for various testing levels—from subcritical diagnostics to contained underground detonations.

Experts believe that, should Moscow proceed, initial steps will likely involve subcritical or hydrodynamic experiments—non-explosive tests designed to evaluate the performance of nuclear materials and components without triggering a chain reaction. These would support stockpile stewardship and modernization efforts while signaling technical capability below the threshold of a full test. Possible subsequent phases could include low-yield, contained underground tests validating warhead designs for systems such as the Yars, Sarmat, and Bulava ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. In the non-strategic arena, smaller, lower-yield weapons compatible with dual-capable delivery systems may also be validated to enhance theater-range deterrence.

The directive also touches on Russia’s “exotic” strategic systems, notably the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-capable underwater drone. While these platforms don’t currently require explosive testing, future validation of their warhead designs or environmental resilience could necessitate specialized underground trials.

Russia’s move follows U.S. statements hinting at a possible return to nuclear testing. Although Washington has yet to confirm such intent, Moscow’s response reflects its policy of mirroring U.S. actions. After de-ratifying the CTBT in 2023, Russia positioned itself legally on par with the United States, which has signed but not ratified the treaty.

By combining political authorization with technical readiness, Russia has shortened the decision time between planning and execution, heightening the risk of a renewed nuclear testing cycle. Analysts warn this could undermine global arms-control frameworks, allied confidence, and strategic stability, potentially reigniting a new era of nuclear competition.